This study bases itself in the epistemological and methodological development of a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue where various voices in the form of different domains converse in order to establish an integrated whole. The research contributes to the actual corporative question regarding spirituality in the workplace, specifically aimed at the individual in the middle-career phase. This phase is characterised as a re-evaluation period aimed at personal and professional growth. A shift in emphasis to the meaning and sense of work is (...) linked to spiritual intelligence as spirituality can be described and understood as a type of intelligence. The study shows that the middle-career experience provides opportunity for an altered future view. Lifestyle coaching serves as facilitating process and offers guidance in answering existential questions which are included in the spiritual. The probable outcome promises to add meaning as a manifesting component in a dynamic and transforming life strategy. (shrink)

PurposeThis paper aims to explore poverty issues in South Africa, to investigate some of the key contributions that knowledge management can make in the eradication of poverty and to suggest a strategy of knowledge management for poverty eradication in South Africa.Design/methodology/approachThis is a conceptual paper. Secondary data sources, in the form of journal articles, policy documents, newspaper articles and the internet, were consulted.FindingsThis paper contributes to the debates on moving towards an integrated poverty strategy that goes beyond reducing poverty by (...) simply raising national income. The paper advocates for a contextualised knowledge management strategy tailored to specific poverty intervention projects and communities. It also suggests that a knowledge management strategy will result in permanent investment in knowledge and the human development of people.Research limitations/implicationsGiven that this is a conceptual paper, the paper recommends empirical future studies that will implement this strategy within specific poverty-stricken communities in the country.Practical/implicationsThe paper raises awareness among policy and decision-makers of the importance of knowledge management as a tool for poverty eradication. In the knowledge economy, knowledge assets – other than the tangible assets of financial capital and local infrastructure – are the prime creator of wealth. It adds to the body of knowledge on knowledge management for poverty eradication by the World Bank and other international organisations.Social implicationsA knowledge management strategy will create an environment in which human development is attained and the minds of the poor are transformed. It will enhance policy formulation and implementation, empower the poor and create a learning organisation.Originality/valueThe paper presents a proposed strategy for knowledge management for poverty eradication in South Africa. (shrink)

Because no single person or group holds knowledge about all aspects of research, mechanisms are needed to support knowledge exchange and engagement. Expertise in the research setting necessarily includes scientific and methodological expertise, but also expertise gained through the experience of participating in research and/or being a recipient of research outcomes. Engagement is, by its nature, reciprocal and relational: the process of engaging research participants, patients, citizens and others brings them closer to the research but also brings the research closer (...) to them. When translating research into practice, engaging the public and other stakeholders is explicitly intended to make the outcomes of translation relevant to its constituency of users. In practice, engagement faces numerous challenges and is often time-consuming, expensive and ‘thorny’ work. We explore the epistemic and ontological considerations and implications of four common critiques of engagement methodologies that contest: representativeness, communication and articulation, impacts and outcome, and democracy. The ECOUTER methodology addresses problems of representation and epistemic foundationalism using a methodology that asks, “How could it be otherwise?” ECOUTER affords the possibility of engagement where spatial and temporal constraints are present, relying on saturation as a method of ‘keeping open’ the possible considerations that might emerge and including reflexive use of qualitative analytic methods. This paper describes the ECOUTER process, focusing on one worked example and detailing lessons learned from four other pilots. ECOUTER uses mind-mapping techniques to ‘open up’ engagement, iteratively and organically. ECOUTER aims to balance the breadth, accessibility and user-determination of the scope of engagement. An ECOUTER exercise comprises four stages: engagement and knowledge exchange; analysis of mindmap contributions; development of a conceptual schema ; and feedback, refinement and development of recommendations. ECOUTER refuses fixed truths but also refuses a fixed nature. Its promise lies in its flexibility, adaptability and openness. ECOUTER will be formed and re-formed by the needs and creativity of those who use it. (shrink)

Savage et al. and Mehr et al. provide well-substantiated arguments that the evolution of musicality was shaped by adaptive functions of social bonding and credible signalling. However, they are too quick to dismiss byproduct explanations of music evolution, and to present their theories as complete unitary accounts of the phenomenon.

This Omnibus edition brings together four classic works on Hinduism by renowned scholars, providing the liturgical, historical, anthropological, and individualist's interpretation of the religion. With an introduction by T.N. Madan, this volume will make an excellent and very comprehensivecollector's item on the subject of Hinduism.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 16-18, January 2012.

Recently, shifting societal attitudes towards animals have resulted in an increasing challenge to the ‘social license’ to use animals in competitive sport. Against that background, this paper explores whether the use of animals in competitive sport is ever justifiable from the perspective of three commonly used ethical theories: deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. In so doing, it recognises the importance of human understanding of animals as sentient beings. The author argues that when deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics are each used (...) to consider the question ‘Is the use of animals in sport ethically justifiable?’, only absolutist rights theory leads to a negative conclusion. Specified rights theory, utilitarianism and virtue ethics all allow for the human use of animals in sport. However, the author then goes onto argue that even if one does not accept an absolutist rights point of view and does believe that the use of animals in sport is generally ethically justifiable, that use should be limited by fulfilment of certain ‘qualifying constraints’: (a) minimisation of negative welfare effects and maximisation of positive welfare effects, to enable ‘good lives’ for animals (b) identification of and mitigation against avoidable, unnecessary risk and (c) compliance with governing body regulations and the law. (shrink)

Depuis plusieurs années, le principe de précaution prend de l’ampleur et voit ses contours se modeler et se définir, aussi bien à l’échelle internationale qu’européenne ou française. Malgré tout, il n’a pas la même importance, en fonction de l’échelle à laquelle on se place, et tend à être confondu avec le principe de prévention, deux notions pourtant totalement distinctes. Plus que jamais les questions de climat, de biodiversité, de justice sociale, de gestion des deniers publics ou encore de valorisation et (...) de gestion des ressources sont au cœur des problématiques gérées par les territoires et notamment, par les communes, premier échelon territorial de décision. Le principe de précaution qui inonde l’ensemble de ces matières voit ses contours réduits en France, notamment par une jurisprudence autocentrée, préférant faire la part belle aux questions franco-française d’organisation territoriale, plutôt que d’appliquer un principe qui devient universel, favorisant ainsi l’inertie de l’État central plutôt que l’action locale. Une situation qui ne saurait perdurer davantage. (shrink)

Reinhold Niebuhr was a Protestant preacher, an influential religious thinker, and an important moral guide in mid-twentieth-century America. But what does he have to say to us now? In what way does he inform the thinking of political leaders and commentators from Barack Obama and Madeleine Albright to David Brooks and Walter Russell Mead, all of whom acknowledge his influence? In this lively overview of Niebuhr's career, Charles Lemert analyzes why interest in Niebuhr is rising and how Niebuhr provides (...) the answers we ache for in the face of seismic shifts in the global order. In the middle of the twentieth century, having outgrown a theological liberalism, Niebuhr challenged and rethought the nonsocialist Left in American politics. He developed a political realism that refused to sacrifice ideals to mere pragmatism, or politics to bitterness and greed. He examined the problem of morality in an immoral society and reimagined the balance between rights and freedom for the individual and social justice for the many. With brevity and deep insight, Lemert shows how Niebuhr's ideas illuminate our most difficult questions today. (shrink)

Marie-Madeleine Dienesch, disparue en janvier 1998, appartient à la génération des jeunes parlementaires qui commencent une carrière politique à la Libération, au sein du MRP. Son élection dans les Côtes-du-Nord, en 1945, est un peu le fruit du hasard. Cet article étudie comment M.-M. Dienesch s’affirme comme l’une des principales responsables du MRP et comment son enracinement dans ce département breton lui permet d’accéder à des responsabilités parlementaires. C’est l’une des rares femmes à s’imposer durablement dans la vie politique (...) française sous la IVe puis sous la Ve République gaullienne et pompidolienne, et à participer aux gouvernements de 1968 à 1974. (shrink)

Marie-Madeleine Dienesch, disparue en janvier 1998, appartient à la génération des jeunes parlementaires qui commencent une carrière politique à la Libération, au sein du MRP. Son élection dans les Côtes-du-Nord, en 1945, est un peu le fruit du hasard. Cet article étudie comment M.-M. Dienesch s’affirme comme l’une des principales responsables du MRP et comment son enracinement dans ce département breton lui permet d’accéder à des responsabilités parlementaires. C’est l’une des rares femmes à s’imposer durablement dans la vie politique (...) française sous la IVe puis sous la Ve République gaullienne et pompidolienne, et à participer aux gouvernements de 1968 à 1974. (shrink)

Le texte de Madeleine Pelletier a été publié pour la première fois dans La Voix des femmes à la fin de l'année 1921, puis édité en volume séparé dès 1922. Le récit du trajet Paris ­ Moscou occupe à lui seul le tiers du volume : il a pris six semaines ! C'est que l'illustre féministe voyage en « illégale » (sans passeport), grâce à l'aide des réseaux communistes ; l'adjectif « aventureux » est parfaitement justifié, car les aléas (...) sont nombreux. Ces pages donnent quelques aperçus sur l'E.. (shrink)

Le texte de Madeleine Pelletier a été publié pour la première fois dans La Voix des femmes à la fin de l'année 1921, puis édité en volume séparé dès 1922. Le récit du trajet Paris ­ Moscou occupe à lui seul le tiers du volume : il a pris six semaines! C'est que l'illustre féministe voyage en « illégale » (sans passeport), grâce à l'aide des réseaux communistes ; l'adjectif « aventureux » est parfaitement justifié, car les aléas sont (...) nombreux. Ces pages donnent quelques aperçus sur l'E... (shrink)

En utilisant des exemples tirés d’une famille esclave de la Réunion et de l’île Maurice, cet article analyse comment le choix des prénoms ainsi que des noms de famille a marqué le statut de ses membres et a signalé ou bien dissimulé leurs relations de parenté. Selon le droit colonial français, les pères esclaves ne disposaient pas du statut de pères, mais les noms des esclaves et de leurs descendants conservaient les traces de leur ascendance maternelle en portant le nom (...) de famille de leur mère. Comme le statut des enfants esclaves était déterminé par la condition de leur mère, les archives coloniales préservaient souvent la trace de l’ascendance maternelle en effaçant la mémoire de leurs pères – esclaves ou libres. Quand le nombre des affranchis et de leurs descendants a augmenté pendant la première moitié du xixe siècle, la pratique d’adopter le prénom de la mère comme nom de famille est devenue commune. C’est ainsi que la féminisation des noms de famille des descendants d’esclaves les a marqués insidieusement et a favorisé leur discrimination officieuse jusqu’à présent. (shrink)

En utilisant des exemples tirés d’une famille esclave de la Réunion et de l’île Maurice, cet article analyse comment le choix des prénoms ainsi que des noms de famille a marqué le statut de ses membres et a signalé ou bien dissimulé leurs relations de parenté. Selon le droit colonial français, les pères esclaves ne disposaient pas du statut de pères, mais les noms des esclaves et de leurs descendants conservaient les traces de leur ascendance maternelle en portant le nom (...) de famille de leur mère. Comme le statut des enfants esclaves était déterminé par la condition de leur mère, les archives coloniales préservaient souvent la trace de l’ascendance maternelle en effaçant la mémoire de leurs pères – esclaves ou libres. Quand le nombre des affranchis et de leurs descendants a augmenté pendant la première moitié du xixe siècle, la pratique d’adopter le prénom de la mère comme nom de famille est devenue commune. C’est ainsi que la féminisation des noms de famille des descendants d’esclaves les a marqués insidieusement et a favorisé leur discrimination officieuse jusqu’à présent. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that predictive processing (PP) theory cannot account for the phenomenon of affect-biased attention prioritized attention to stimuli that are affectively salient because of their associations with reward or punishment. Specifically, the PP hypothesis that selective attention can be analyzed in terms of the optimization of precision expectations cannot accommodate affect-biased attention; affectively salient stimuli can capture our attention even when precision expectations are low. We review the prospects of three recent attempts to accommodate affect with (...) tools internal to PP theory: Miller and Clark’s (2018) embodied inference; Seth’s (2013) interoceptive inference; and Joffily and Coricelli’s (2013) rate of change of free energy. In each case we argue that the account does not resolve the challenge from affect-biased attention. For this reason, we conclude that prediction error minimization is not sufficient to explain all mental phenomena, contrary to the claim that the PP framework provides a unified theory of all mental phenomena or the brain ‘s cognitive functioning. Nevertheless, we suggest that empirical investigation of the interaction between affective salience and precision expectations should prove helpful in understanding the limits of PP theory, and may provide new directions for the application of a Bayesian perspective to perception. (shrink)

Kendall Walton’s project in ‘Categories of Art’ (1970) is to answer two questions. First, does the history of an artwork’s production determine its aesthetic properties? Second, how – if at all – should knowledge of the history of a work’s production influence our aesthetic judgments of its properties? While his answer to the first has been clearly understood, his answer to the second less so. Contrary to how many have interpreted Walton, such knowledge is not necessary for making aesthetic judgments; (...) perceiving an artwork as belonging to a (correct) category of art requires no art-historical knowledge whatsoever. Moreover, contextualist attempts to incorporate art-historical knowledge via the mechanism of cognitive penetration are incompatible with Walton’s claim that categories of art must be perceptually distinguishable. Here I propose a way of elaborating Walton’s view that avoids this difficulty and reconciles contextualism with aesthetic perception, the view that we perceive aesthetic properties. (shrink)

This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total (...) benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change. (shrink)

Does the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might (...) hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form. (shrink)

The acquaintance debate in aesthetics has been traditionally divided between pessimists, who argue that testimony does not provide others with aesthetic knowledge of artworks, and optimists, who hold that acquaintance with an artwork is not a necessary precondition for acquiring aesthetic knowledge. In this paper I propose a reconciliationist solution to the acquaintance debate: while aesthetic knowledge can be had via testimony, aesthetic judgment requires acquaintance with the artwork. I develop this solution by situating it within a virtue aesthetics framework (...) based on Ernest Sosa's virtue epistemology. I go on to apply the solution to the debates on moral testimony and expert testimony. An interesting variant on Gettier cases emerges: cases in which subjects have knowledge, but it has been formed by the wrong competence. (shrink)

While the view that we perceive aesthetic properties may seem intuitive, it has received little in the way of explicit defence. It also gives rise to a puzzle. The first strand of this puzzle is that we often cannot perceive aesthetic properties of artworks without training, yet much aesthetic training involves the acquisition of knowledge, such as when an artwork was made, and by whom. How, if at all, can this knowledge affect our perception of an artwork’s aesthetic properties? The (...) second strand of the puzzle arises when we widen the scope of aesthetic experience. The very same aesthetic properties that seem to require training for their perception in artworks do not appear to require training to perceive in objects of everyday aesthetic appreciation and natural phenomena. In this paper I argue that a prominent extant attempt to explain how training is compatible with aesthetic perception—cognitive permeation—is an inadequate solution. I also develop a positive view of aesthetic perception that provides a unified solution to both strands of the puzzle. (shrink)

Perceptual learning is an enduring change in the perceptual system – and our resulting perceptions – due to practice or repeated exposure to a perceptual stimulus. It is involved in the acquisition of perceptual expertise: the ability to make rapid and reliable high-level categorizations of objects unavailable to novices. Attentional weighting is one process by which perceptual learning occurs. Advancing our understanding of this process is of particular importance for understanding what is learned in perceptual learning. Attentional weighting seems to (...) favour the hypothesis that what experts learn is simply to better direct their attention to elements of the stimulus relevant to making post-perceptual categorizations. Here I argue against this hypothesis. Attentional weighting is an integral component of the process that allows experts to come to represent high-level properties in perceptual experience. (shrink)

It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it cannot accommodate. (...) We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is ‘all the brain ever does’. (shrink)

How do institutions respond to expert contests over epistemologies of sex and gender? In this article, I consider how epistemological ascendancy in debates over the regulation of women athletes with high testosterone is established within a legal setting. Approaching regulation as an institutional act that defines forms of embodied difference, the legitimacy of which may be called into question, I show how sexed bodies are enacted through and as part of determinations of expertise. I focus on proceedings from 2015 when (...) the Court of Arbitration for Sport was asked to decide whether an Indian sprinter, Dutee Chand, could compete as a female athlete. Despite acknowledging that sexed bodies are unruly, the court ultimately endorsed the use of testosterone as seemingly essential to women’s athletic performance, thereby reasserting a two-category model of biological difference. The legitimacy of these regulatory efforts was established through the concurrent narrowing of expertise and the body, a process that is also revealed to be gendered. (shrink)

Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic compensation and non-apologetic (...) compensation. Apologetic compensation, I argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer of money, goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic compensation is sufficient for moral repair. (shrink)

For many philosophers, there is a tension inherent to shame as an inward-looking, yet intersubjective, emotion: that between the role of the ashamed self and the part of the shaming Other in pronouncing the judgement of shame. Simply put, the issue is this: either the perspective of the ashamed self takes precedence in autonomously choosing to feel shame, and the necessary role of the audience is overlooked, or else the view of the shaming Other prevails in heteronomously casting the shame, (...) and the ashamed individual’s agency becomes problematically understated. I argue that this debate is fundamentally misguided insofar as it assumes that shame must be exclusively contingent upon either the perspective of the self or that of the Other, when it is in fact dependent upon both at once. This is the “double movement” of shame: an appraisal of the self that is at once social and private. (shrink)

This article offers an account of organizational change to explain why women leaders are underrepresented compared to women athletes in many sports organizations. I distinguish between accommodation and transformation as forms of change: the former includes women without challenging binary constructions of gender, the latter transforms an organization’s gendered logic. Through a case study of the International Olympic Committee from 1967-1995, I trace how the organization came to define gender equity primarily in terms of accommodating women’s segregated athletic participation. Key (...) to this was the construction of women’s bodies as athletically able but inferior to men, an arrangement formalized in codified rules and procedures and legitimized by external stakeholders. Defined in these terms, gender equity did little to transform the organization’s binary and hierarchically gendered logic, which continued to shape the informal norms and procedures associated with the organization’s allegedly gender-neutral and meritocratic yet male-dominated leadership. I argue that the exclusion of women from ostensibly gender-integrated leadership positions allows organizations to avoid revealing gender similarity between men and women. This maintains a logic underpinned by notions of binary gender difference and masculine superiority. (shrink)

This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total (...) benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change. (shrink)

Attempts to engineer a generally intelligent artificial agent have yet to meet with success, largely due to the (intercontext) frame problem. Given that humans are able to solve this problem on a daily basis, one strategy for making progress in AI is to look for disanalogies between humans and computers that might account for the difference. It has become popular to appeal to the emotions as the means by which the frame problem is solved in human agents. The purpose of (...) this paper is to evaluate the tenability of this proposal, with a primary focus on Dylan Evans’ search hypothesis and Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. I will argue that while the emotions plausibly help solve the intracontext frame problem, they do not function to solve or help solve the intercontext frame problem, as they are themselves subject to contextual variability. (shrink)

This chapter addresses a general question: What is responsible risking? It explores the notion of "responsible risking" as a thick moral concept, and it argues that the notion can be given moral content that could be action-guiding and add an important tool to our moral toolbox. To impose risks responsibly, on this view, is to take on responsibility in a good way. A core part of responsible risking, this chapter argues, is some version of a Forethought Condition. Such a condition (...) requires us to not make decisions or plans such that we could not deliver on our responsibility obligations. This chapter argues that three moral obligations can be derived from descriptive notions of responsibility. They are (1) the control condition, (2) the responsibility to fix condition, and (3) the responsibility to explain condition. The idea is that in order to impose risks responsibly we ought not act in ways that undermine our ability to remain in control over the risks, undermine our ability to sort out negative outcomes by reparations or compensation, or undermine our prospects of providing an explanation for our actions that also makes sense in hindsight and to those affected. This idea is then tried out on the case of germline gene editing. It is argued that such a moral notion of responsibility is also action-guiding when we do not know for certain what is the morally right or obligatory action all-things-considered due to epistemic gaps. (shrink)

This paper extends previous attempts at understanding the nature of organizational integrity and its increasingly important role for companies which, after all, bear a moral and societal responsibility. Interpretations of organizational integrity in business ethics literature incorporate aspects ranging from the behavior of managers and employees to corporate structures and incentive systems. We argue that virtue ethics builds an indispensable framework for understanding the origin of the concept of integrity and transfer these findings to an organizational level. Hence, we first (...) define organizational integrity, and second operationalize it in a closed three-step process, consisting of morally sound corporate commitments, their transparent institutionalization within the company, and their implementation into actions. We consider the main goal of organizational integrity to be of a preventative investment nature. Organizational integrity is a company investment that translates into avoiding fines for potential violations of the law or ethical missteps, as well as an investment in the company’s reputation. In turn, organizational integrity can protect a company from disruptions that can threaten its existence. Defining and operationalizing the concept of organizational integrity provides the foundation for future scientific research and the basis for developing practical guidance for organizations and managers. (shrink)

What kind of moral principle could be sufficiently restrictive to avoid the kind of large-scale risks that have resulted in catastrophe in the past, while at the same time not be so restrictive as to halt desirable progress? Is there such a principle that is not merely a precautionary principle, but one that could be based on firm moral grounds? In this article, I set out to explore a simple idea: might it be the case that reparability could serve as (...) a moral constraint against risky policy decisions? The idea is simple, but comes in two forms. First, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for harm that is, in principle, irreparable, such that it would bring about a permanent loss of a kind qua kind. Second, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for a reparable (but not compensable) harm that exceeds what realistically could be repaired. I set out here to do two things. First, I describe the moral problem to be addressed for any principle-guiding decisions about risk. A central claim in this article is that risk decisions are epistemically impaired decisions, and that we must, alongside outcome uncertainty, also take both epistemic uncertainty and moral uncertainty into account. Second, I introduce the idea of reparability as a moral constraint in the form of two versions of the Reparability Principle. Such a principle, I argue, could have some interesting advantages that seem both morally intuitive and that come with some advantages against some of the epistemic challenges posed by risk impositions. (shrink)

In this article, our concern is to describe how body(ies) and self are performed in women’s birth narratives through the mediation of a number of significant elements, including technical devices. We will show how, in these narratives, (1) action is distributed among a series of actants, including professionals and technology; (2) that dichotomies appear which cannot be reduced to one of body/mind, but are more adequately described in terms of ‘body-in-labour’/’embodied self’, each of them being locally performed through the mediation (...) of medical practices, knowledge and technologies, the definition of these elements and of their relations being specific to each obstetrical configuration; (3) that part of professionals’ activities is devoted to the detailed management of the articulation between the body-in-labour and the embodied self, and to monitoring their joint transformations. (shrink)